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VERTICAL RESTRAINTS FACILITATING HORIZONTAL COLLUSION: 
‘STRETCHING’ AGREEMENTS IN A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
Murilo Lubambo* 
 
Abstract: This article discusses the approaches of the European Union (EU) and of the United 
States (US) to the notions of agreement and concerted practice applied to horizontal collusive 
consequences of vertical restraints. It concludes that networks of vertical restraints blur the 
differences between vertical and horizontal agreements; therefore, both options of attack are 
available for enforcers in the EU and the US context. If the analysed vertical restraints are 
adopted in  parallel  by  agreement, they should  be deemed illegal  as  long  as  they restrict 
competition  producing collusive consequences.  In the absence of explicit coordination to 
adopt the practice, I suggest first looking for a stretched concept of horizontal agreement or a 
broadly interpreted concept of concerted practice, including unilateral ‘communication’ that 
intentionally reduces uncertainty. Even when the analysed practices are adopted individually 
and not by all firms, they can represent a commitment to focal points, observable by market 
players, thus amounting to communication of intent. If that is not possible, I propose that an 
analysis of market power, incentives, coercion and induction should guide the finding of an 
illegal  vertical  agreement  and  ground  the  analysis  of  the  consequences.  The 
agreement/concerted practice path is an appropriate, feasible and coherent way to deal with 
vertical  restraints  facilitating  horizontal  tacit  coordination,  but  that  does  not  exclude 
alternative effective enforcement mechanisms. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This article discusses the approaches of the European Union (EU) and of the United States 
(US)  to  the  notions  of  agreement  and  concerted  practice  applied  to  horizontal  collusive 
consequences  of  vertical  restraints.  In  order  to  avoid  misunderstandings,  I  shall  use 
‘collusion’ to label the ‘economic’ notion of supra-competitive outcomes in some oligopoly 
markets  and  the  legal  terminology  ‘tacit  coordination’  to  describe  this  outcome  arising 
without any direct combination between the parties.1 The problem of oligopoly pricing and 
the problem of collusion  – arriving at a mutually agreeable price and maintaining it in the 
face of entry and temptations to cheat – are essentially the same.2 As shown by Posner, the 
oligopoly structure of the market is just one of the conditions favourable to collusion, among 
others such as: inelastic demand at competitive price; buying side of the market non -
concentrated; standard non-durable product; principal firms selling at the same level in the 
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chain of distribution; co-operative practices; price competition more important than other 
forms; similar cost structures and production processes.3 
Collusion  is  sustainable  only  if  firms  put  sufficient  weight  on  future  profits 
(represented by the discount factor) in order to sacrifice short-term gains, such as in growing 
markets with high barriers to entry. 4 Frequent interaction and price adjustments facilitate 
collusion while lack of transparency makes it more difficult. 5 In summation, the basic 
challenges for firms that want collusive price/quantities with or without combination are: 
i)  identifying  mutually  beneficial  strategy  and  outcome,  since  market 
perceptions may vary; 
ii)  monitoring  adherence  and  detecting  deviation,  eg  increasing  market 
transparency;6 
iii)  punishing deviations with effective and credible sources, (retaliation)7 such as 
recourse to a ‘trigger price’, below which a price war begins.8 
As  a  starting  point,  I  briefly  analyse  the  so-called  facilitating  practices  (FPs)  in 
oligopoly markets.9 Co-operative strategic behaviour means the actions taken by rival firms 
in their own self-interest in order to raise the oligopoly price closer to the monopoly level. 10 
As stated by Gavil and others, firms can take unilateral decisions, understood as efforts to 
change the structure of the market to facilitate collusion.11 
The so-called FPs relate to ‘the conduct by firms … that falls somewhere between an 
explicit, ‘hardcore’ cartel agreement and pure and simple oligopolistic interdependence and 
helps  firms  to  reduce  uncertainty  in  the  market  and  coordinate  their  conduct  more 
effectively’.12 In the drive to increase gains, undertakings develop ways to coordinate while 
creatively complying with case law and evading the rigour of the rules. Most of the FPs I 
shall report actually try to create or emulate the described ‘favourable conditions’ to reach the 
three challenges above, as to artificially reinforce the oligopoly structure of the market. 
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Another frontier for antitrust enforcement,13 dampening competition theories focus on 
strategic  behaviour  encouraging  anticompetitive  co -operation  or  discouraging  vigorous 
competition  by  horizontal  rivals  particularly  through  a  commitment  to  less  aggressive 
conducts.14 In Baker’s opinion, these theories and FPs are not exactly the same: while FPs 
apply when there are repeated games in non-co-operative settings, dampening competition 
relates to static settings, with low number of firms, no entry and almost no exogenous shifts 
in cost or demand pressing down prices.15 The European Commission Guidelines on Vertical 
Restraints (GVR) seem to adopt a convergent approach of these effects; 16 thus, I shall treat 
them as the same phenomenon. 
After outlining the traditional horizontal practices, I present FPs in a vertical context 
in  the  following  categories:  exchange  o f  information  in  vertical  relationships,  parallel 
adoption of vertical restraints (with and without agreement) and individual adoption of 
vertical restraints. Although these kinds of vertical FPs are a specific facet of the general 
‘oligopoly problem’, I defend its solution as more feasible by using article 101(1) of the 
TFEU17 even absent either explicit coordination or exchange of information. In this regard, a 
non-exhaustive but illustrative comparative approach will be adopted in relation to Section 1 
of the Sherman Act (‘Section 1’) and Chapter I of the UK Competition Act 1998. 
I  argue  that  the  horizontal/vertical  dichotomy,  though  dangerous,  is  still  a  useful 
notion.  Therefore,  two  legal  options  are  evaluated.  The  first  one  is  the  application  of 
horizontal  law  to  vertical  restraints,  ‘stretching’  the  concept  of  agreement  and  concerted 
practices to accommodate bilateral or trilateral schemes. The second option is to use the 
vertical agreement’s path, with no beneficial treatment under the vertical block exemptions 
(VBEs)18 or under article 101(3). I dwell on the standard of pleading and on the role of intent 
and, afterwards, I describe several types of vertical restraints with collusive effects, having 
recourse to the concepts developed. Finally, as to the  enforcement perspective, I analyse the 
consequences  of  unlawfulness  (fines  and  settlements)  and  briefly  present  alternative 
enforcement initiatives such as the use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Comission Act 
(FTC) Act (‘Section 5’) and market investigations. 
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B.  FACILITATING PRACTICES: GENERAL PANORAMA 
1.  Horizontal Context: Traditional View19 
Professor Hay categorises as FPs the following: firstly, when there is an agreement easily 
proved to implement them; secondly, where one observes parallel adoption of FPs, but each 
of several competitors independently uses them; thirdly, where only one of the firms engages 
in FPs, making it easier for the other oligopolists to act anticompetitively.20 Exchanges of 
price information between competitors when not supporting a  cartel spread over the three 
categories and are a classical example of FPs. Discussions about current and future prices are 
characterised by EU law as price-fixing agreements as object in their own right. 21 Also, an 
isolated exchange may constitute sufficient basis for a concerted practice.22 
The  Guidelines  on  the  applicability  of  Article  101  to  horizontal  co -operation 
agreements (GHC)23 contain a detailed section about exchange of information compiling EU 
Courts’  case  law  and  exemplifying  the  application  of  the  object/effects  duality  and 
efficiencies under article 101(3).Price parameters and categories, and other data may be the 
object of parallel adoption, making competition softer.24 Restrictive agreements on terms and 
offers to consumers, such as level of di scounts and advertisement, 25 may be related to 
secondary aspects of competition; they are thus caught by article 101(1). 26 These practices 
when adopted in agreement do not raise questions on the establishment of a violation.27 
Posner28 and Turner 29 agree that,  in order to establish a violation of the Sherman 
Act,30 it is unnecessary that the sellers had agreed to establish an FP. However, both Boise 
and Cascade31 and DuPont32 showed the US Courts’ reluctance to accept the ban of parallel 
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22  Case  C -8/08  T-Mobile  Netherlands  BV  and  Others  v  Raad  van  bestuur  van  de  Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECJ ECR I-4529 para 59. 
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but  non-agreed  adoption  of  various  FPs.  Less  clear  is  when  practices  are  adopted 
individually. Posner comments that publicly announced policy of matching any competitor’s 
price cut and public discussions of the right price ‘should be scrutinized carefully’.33 
Advance notice of price increases may be used to avoid the first firm’s disadvantage 
in  raising  prices. 34 It  signals  to  other  players  the  firm’s  future  policy,  facilitating  tacit 
coordination in oligopolistic markets.35 An understanding that firms in a market will follow 
the signal from time to time emitted by the price leader can amount to tacit coordination, 
branded as an agreement or concerted practice under article 101 and Chapter I prohibition. 36 
Also, the mere receipt of information already reduces uncertainty and may amount to   a 
concerted practice.37 
2.  Vertical Context 
Separation between suppliers and dealers can lead to higher prices than vertical integration if 
vertical restraints are seen as a commitment to less aggressive competition.38 Concerns about 
the  collusive  effects  of  v ertical  restraints  derive  from  their  impact  in  the 
modelling/strengthening of the market structure. That is why we can frame them as FPs. 
Discussion of current and future prices and other commercial strategies may also occur in a 
vertical  context.  In  fact,   exchange  of  information  is  in  the  essence  of  every  vertical 
relationship, under the obligation of the performance of vertical contracts. 39 It gives rise to 
competition concerns when: a) the information is passed on to competitors through indirect 
contact by means of downstream/upstream common supplier/distributor/agent or; b) the 
upstream/downstream contractor is also a competitor.40 In distribution chains, some antitrust 
cases in the US and in Europe have been brought under the general heading of hub and spoke 
arrangements (HSAs). This occurs where, by means of one supplier or one retailer, two or 
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34 Carlton and Perloff (n 10) 380. 
35 Albertina Jones and Brenda Suffrin, EC Competition Law – Text, Cases and Materials (OUP 2008) 916. 
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104/85, C-114/85, C-116-117 and C-125-129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission (Woodpulp II) 
[1993] ECR I-1307. 
38 Baker (n 14) 529. 
39 Peter Whelan, ‘Trading Negotiations between Retailers and Suppliers: A Fertile Ground for Anti-competitive 
Horizontal Information Exchange?’(2009) December 5(3) European Competition Journal 823. 
40 See Section D(6) of this paper. Vertical Restraints Facilitating Horizontal Collusion: ‘Stretching’ Agreements in a 
Comparative Approach 
140 
more retailers or suppliers communicate future market intentions or become aware of them, 
arrange common strategies or fix their wholesale/retail prices. 
The  famous  HSA  in  Interstate  Circuit 41  involved  film  producers/distributors 
‘compelled’ to apply a policy favourable to an expensive first-run theatre, to the detriment of 
cheap subsequent-run theatres. Butz and Kleit argue that the collusive outcome could have 
been achieved without an inference of agreement between distributors because it was in their 
own interest to do so.42 In the 1990s, Toys “R” Us (TRU)43, the largest US toy retailer, 
successfully convinced suppliers to restrict the range of products they sold to its competing 
warehouse discounting stores. The FTC brought an action challenging not only the vertical 
contracts but also the ‘orchestration’ of a horizontal agreement, since the suppliers would 
only  have  incentive  to  leave  the  warehouse  if  their  competitors  also  did.  According  to 
Scherer,44 the FTC rejected the free-rider defence as TRU’s promotional effort was already 
largely  compensated  by  the  manufacturers. 45 In Europe,  Musique  Diffusion  Francaise 46 
comprised  a  HSA  involving  Pioneer  electronic  products  distributors  in  France  that 
complained about parallel imports. Pioneer communicated these complaints to its exclusive 
dealers and organised meetings to control the situation. 
Two  paradigmatic  UK  cases  involved  indirect  contact  via  an  intermediary. 47 In 
Replica Football Kits,48 the HSA was created as the result of a complaint from a powerful 
licensor and retailer (Manchester United – MU) to a supplier of replica football shorts and T-
shirts (Umbro) that it was being undercut by some competitors. MU was going to leave the 
supplier unless it convinced others to raise their prices by enforcing its recommended retail 
price  (RRP).49 Umbro then put pressure on its retailers not to discount the price of the 
football kits. A HSA and several vertical agreements between Umb ro and its retailers led to 
the imposition of fines. 
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Hasbro, a toy producer, was concerned in Argos50 that the reduced margin for its 
retailers  might  press  it  to  lower  its  prices,  and  thus  established  a  RRP  policy.  The  co-
operation of Argos, the main retailer and price setter, and Littlewoods, main competitor of 
Argos, was essential so Hasbro held individual conversations reassuring that the other one 
would follow the suggested price. The overall HSA was composed by two bilateral vertical 
agreements between each of the parties and a trilateral agreement. The GHC mentions that 
indirect  information  exchange  through  third  parties  may  involve  the  parties'  suppliers  or 
retailers.51 This means that the Commission is willing to apply the same general principles to 
HSAs. 
As to other vertical restraints, the concern with tacit coordination is present in the 
GVR in the following references: exclusion from the VBE of vertical agreements entered into 
between competing undertakings;52 collusion derived from agency agreements;53 softening of 
competition  and  facilitation  of  tacit  coordination  reducing  inter -brand  and  intra -brand 
competition;54 express inclusion of explicit and tacit collusion and relationship with market 
structure;55 analysis of network of agreements and behaviour indicating tacit coordination;56 
single branding; 57 limited distribution agreements; 58 category management; 59 and RPM. 60 
Finally, while vertical practices adopted in parallel should be scrutinised, practices adopted 
individually can constitute focal points, that is, qualitatively identifiable and unambiguous 
signals as to the preferred outcome, observable by other firms, and constituting the self-
evident way to behave.61 It appears that if unilateral price announcements may amount to 
concerted practices, individually adopted vertical practices should also do. 
 
C.  DISCUSSING SUBSTANTIVE CATEGORIES 
1.  The Horizontal/Vertical Dichotomy 
First of all, the need to address the horizontal/vertical bifurcation derives from the propagated 
view that antitrust authorities should choose horizontal practices as enforcement priorities. 
                                                 
50 OFT No CA98/8/2003 Hasbro UK Ltd/Argos Ltd/Littlewoords Ltd, OFT Decision of 21 Nov 2003 (CP/0480-
01). Argos & Littlewoods v OFT [2005] CAT 13. Argos and Others and OFT (n 48). 
51 See paragraph 55 of the Guidelines (n 23). 
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53 GVR (n 16) para 20. 
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Over-simplification, such as ‘vertical good, horizontal bad’, may be dangerous for the future 
of  antitrust  because  it  ignores  the  potential  horizontal  effects  of  vertical  restraints. 62 
Nevertheless, it is recognised that the categories bring some degree  of legal certainty, 
especially concerning the allocation of the burden of proof and are useful to antitrust resource 
management.63 
Arguably Leegin64 reinforced the formalist approach and ‘extended the scope of the 
dichotomy to  price restrictions’65 since it was  decided that  vertical RPM was  then to  be 
subjected to a rule of reason while horizontal price fixing should be kept following a per se 
rule. Instead of the bifurcation, Lianos66 suggests the adoption of  new categories such as 
dealer-initiated,  as  opposed  to  manufacturer -initiated,  distribution  restraints.  Generally, 
supplier-led  restraints  could  follow  a  more  lenient  approach  because  suppliers’  interests 
coincide with consumers’,67 except where there is upstream market power. The real antitrust 
concern  should  be  to  identify  the  source  of  market  power  (upstream/downstream)  and 
evaluate  collusive  or  exclusionary  effects  that  harm  consumers,  though  these  may  come 
together  in  concrete  challenges.68 The problem is that collusion has been traditionally a 
problem labelled ‘horizontal’, though the per se/object approach is not always adequate. It is 
then defensible that vertical restraints should not be analysed by object, let alone per se, but 
by its likely effects (or under a rule of reason). 
2.  The Concept of Agreement 
The idea of ‘agreement’ has been and will continue to be relevant to antitrust, despite the 
more economic approach. There are jurisdictions in which ‘agreement’ is not needed (eg in 
Brazil),69 but the two most important systems rely on those categories and when ‘agreement’ 
or  a  proxy  thereof  is  present,  any  antitrust  case  is  stronger.  It  is  true  that  pure  tacit 
coordination does not amount to agreement.70 In the  American context, though, conscious 
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65 Lianos (n 62) 180. 
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67 See also Ioannis Lianos, ‘Collusion in Vertical Relations under Article 81(1)’ (2008) 45(4) Common Market 
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parallelism may be evidence of agreement (plus-factor) when facts reveal that decisions were 
interdependent.71 
Posner advocates that tacit coordination is not an unconscious state and that a meeting 
of minds or mutual understanding, even without overt communication , involves an  offer 
accepted by the action of the rivals, and therefore a concerted action.72 However, completely 
independent conducts or tacit coordination of pricing in reaction to external shocks should be 
unobjectionable.73 In fact, absent communication, there must be  some culpable act. Here, 
Hay’s effort to make the concept of tacit coordination meaningful and operational using the 
idea of FPs as culpable acts becomes relevant.74 In the US, as reported by Page, the concept 
of ‘tacit collusion’ was loosely equated with oligopolistic price coordination and conscious 
parallelism and considered not unlawful in itself.75 
Based on that, Hay states the presence of certain plus factors should serve actually to 
define a tacit agreement rather than permit an inference thereof.76 Thus, if the same parallel 
conduct led to supra-competitive pricing and depended on certain actions taken by the group 
of firms to facilitate tacit coordination, its adoption would be culpable, leading to the finding 
of an unlawful tacit agreement, absent any business justification.77 In fact, no agreement to 
reach the practice is necessary because we already have ‘agreement’ in the ‘coordination of 
activity  through  inappropriate  means’. 78 Other  plus  factors,  which  are  not  FPs,  would 
continue to serve as evidence of an explicit agreement. 
3.  The Concept of Concerted Practice 
In the EU, there is a concerted practice when undertakings concert with each other, eg by 
direct or indirect conducts,  aimed at knowingly removing uncertainty as to future market 
behaviour. Since Hüls79 the Commission does not need to demonstrate the practice was put 
into effect: the information exchanged is presumed to have been taken into account, subject 
to rebuttal.80 Although it is claimed that a concerted practice should be equated to the finding 
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72 Posner (n 2) 94, 97. 
73 ibid 96. 
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of an agreement by circumstantial evidence, it is not a residual category and must catch 
something  that  agreement  does  not.81 After rejecting a notion of concerted practice that 
requires common intention while relying on different evidence to agreement, Odudu adopts a 
notion that focuses on reductions of uncertainty and dispenses with common intention. 82 In 
fact, this interpretation is the only interpretation that ensures autonomy of the concept of 
concerted practice. 
Under  current  EU  law,   the  standard  is  very  high  in  the  absence  of  reciprocal 
communication and low in its presence, as  T-Mobile83 has reinforced. Therefore, it is only 
necessary to show that an isolated act of communication knowingly reduces uncertainty, if the 
companies remain active in the market. On the other hand, parallelism of market conduct only 
explained by tacit coordination amounts to a concerted practice. I conclude that it is possible 
to reconcile the two standards if the lack of good evidence of communication, such as using 
indirect  means  like  an  FP  to  communicate  prices  or  reveal  market  intentions,  can  be 
compensated  by  a  high  degree  of  market  parallelism,  with  existent  but  weak  business 
justification.  Therefore,  parallel  adoption  of  FPs  may  be  unlawful  when  it  substantially 
amounts to a restrictive agreement/concerted practice. 
4.  Vertical Agreement and Concerted Practice 
In  a vertical  context,  many practices  escape  application of article 101, leading to  under-
enforcement of antitrust law ‘if there is no evidence of a formal invitation to collude by the 
supplier and acquiescence by the dealers’.84 While the concept of concerted practice is more 
expandable and operational in relation to horizontal practices, the concept of agreement is 
restricted  and  mainly  applied  to  vertical  agreements.85 However, apart from HSAs,  the 
concept of ‘concerted practice’ has been used in a vertical context as a residual category 
when, despite no clear evidence of agreement between the supplier and the distributor, there 
is evidence of coordination; or sanctioning apparently unilateral practice implementing a pre-
existing  vertical  agreement,  not  necessarily  anticompetitively  –  here,  no  acquiescence  is 
required.86 
The debate about the scope of unilateral conduct and the expansion of the concept of  
agreement is still relevant in the EU. In Bayer87 the expansive trend has reverted, since there 
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was no ‘distribution network to which the measures adopted by Bayer could be ascribed’.88 
The European Court decision in Volkswagen89 brought  an interpretation  of the aims of a 
neutral agreement, based on the legal and economic context of the relationship between the 
parties.90 
As to the application of article 101(3) to vertical relations, it should be narrow in 
oligopoly markets since the disposition requires no substantial elimination of competition and 
the Commission’s regulation contains market share caps91. In oligopolies of four firms, each 
with 20-25%, generally the VBEs could be withdrawn, especially in case of parallel adoption 
of vertical restraints. One indication of agreement would be if a substantial and significant 
percentage  of  the  retailers  of  the  distribution  network  have  implemented  the  scheme. 92 
Interestingly, this could lead to ‘a finding of a vertical agreement with the supplier, while it 
could not be sufficient evidence to infer a horizontal agreement or concerted practice between 
the distributors’.93 
5.  The Role Of Intent 
Standards of pleading and of proof are different depending on the system. In this regard, the 
category of ‘intent’ has achieved a prominent role in horizontal and vertical contexts in both 
EU and US doctrine and case law. 
In Page’s opinion, concerning Section 1, the parallel adoption of a FP cannot exclude 
the possibility of independent action by rivals, failing to fulfil the Matsushita standard.94 Page 
argues that US courts pre -  and post-Twombly95 have  implicitly  adopted  a  definition  of 
concerted  action  requiring  communication  of  intent  and  reliance,  especially  when 
communication is private, repeated and related to present/future actions.96 This constitutes ‘a 
tangible, culpable action that differs from the actions of firms in an ordinary competition or in 
a simple conscious parallelism’.97 Some FPs may themselves involve communications, thus 
meeting the underlined definition.98 The question that remains is whether there are FPs that 
do not involve communications, which would result in under-enforcement. The discussion of 
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intent can also be illustrated by means of the already cited UK cases. In Argos99 and Football 
Kits100, the supplier (B) was acting as an intermediary of price pressure among retailers (A 
and C). The role of the supplier in a HSA is comparable to the facilitator of an agreement,101 
subject to fines if her actions are  intentional, if she purposefully passes on information or 
requests, or negligent, if she does not take the necessary duty of care in handling information. 
There  is  an  EU  duty  on  vertical  participants  not  to  encourage  communication  between 
horizontal actors.102 
Whelan depicts three extra scenarios with reference to the kn owledge of the role of 
the supplier in the arrangement: 1) both retailers (A and C) are fully aware thereof; 2) one 
retailer (A or C) is not aware; 3) both are not aware.103 While the two first options do not 
pose a problem, the third is at the root of the d ifference between the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (CAT) and the Court of Appeals (CoAp) approaches to the decision of the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT, predecessor of the Competition and Markets Authority). While the former 
defends that constructive knowledge (reasonable foreseeability) of the role of the supplier is 
enough to constitute a concerted practice, the latter requires that actual knowledge for both 
retailers has to be shown.104 
In Whelan’s view, both approaches are deferential to legitimate vertical discussion 
and the option is a matter of policy and choice of errors to minimize. Albors-Llorens argues 
that the CAT’s position of ‘reasonable expectations’ ‘dilutes the strength of the requirement 
laid  down  in  Dyestuffs’  (knowingly  substitutes  co-operation  for  competition).105 Also, of 
concern is the limited scope of defences retailers have at their disposal: the sender (A) is 
obliged to show that price intentions were revealed for a legitimate purpose and could have 
not foreseen that the intermediary (B) would use information to affect market conditions. 106 
The receiver (C), who did not ask for information, has to distance itself completely and 
publicly from the exchange. 
When the receiver (C) requests or forces information from the supplier (B), only when th e 
sender (A) has knowledge will the granting of information make the flow horizontal.107 This 
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may  open  up  room  for  the  role  of  intent  in  purely  vertical  agreement  analysis  and  the 
following recognition by the CoAp is important: 
[If] there were two separate agreements or concerted practice between [the parties] … 
knowledge of what was going on as regards the other agreement or concerted practice, 
and the interdependent relationship between the two, would mean that each of the 
vertical  concerted  practices  was  capable  of  being  regarded  as  being  as  serious  a 
breach as if there had been a trilateral concerted practice with horizontal operation.108 
The definition of antitrust agreement, at least in a vertical setting, should not be focused on 
‘the  exchange  of  consent  or  a  meeting  of  minds  between  the  parties  but  should  instead 
identify situations of induced or coerced conduct, as opposed to purely unilateral one’.109 In 
fact,  when there is  inducement or coercion,  vertical competition  is  restricted.  Finally, as 
suggested by Lianos, it is better first to look for evidence of a horizontal agreement/concerted 
practice between dealers or suppliers, by means of an intermediary and secondly, if it is not 
possible to find one, to look for a vertical agreement.110 
This two-step procedure is the most appropriate. A firm’s first effort is to signal to 
their competitors, despite using a vertical relation; thus, antitrust should focus on what firms 
prioritise.  If  one  considers  the  parallel  adoption  of  vertical  restraints  by  almost  all  the 
suppliers/dealers, intent can play its role in finding horizontal agreement/concerted practice. 
Anticompetitive intent is present in the use of FPs to communicate a specific commitment to 
price or to the softening competition towards other suppliers/dealers. It is a new kind of HSA, 
which does not involve flow of information or requests to change conduct. In the US, it is 
interesting  to  see  how  this  might  be  analysed  under  the  Twombly  requirements.  If 
‘communication’ cannot be established, each vertical relation and its aggregate effect should 
be  analysed  to  establish  a  vertical  agreement  restricting  horizontal  competition  based  on 
inducement or coercion. 
 
D.  VERTICAL RESTRAINTS WITH COLLUSIVE EFFECTS 
1.  Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses 
In a vertical context, a common object of scrutiny is the most-favoured-customer – MFC 
(also most-favoured-nation – MFN) clause in a sales contract, which guarantees the buyer 
that the seller is not currently selling or will not sell in the future at a lower price to another 
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buyer.111 One variation is the meeting-competition clause in a long-term supply contract or 
price matching in an advertisement, which gives assurance to the buyer that if another seller 
offers a lower price, it will match it or release the buyer from the contract.112 In both cases, 
there is a commitment from the seller and no commitment from the buyer. 113 It is a clause 
inside a contractual arrangement that constitutes a vertical restraint. Used to give comfort to 
smaller buyers, it can have equivalent effects of a reba te or an exclusivity clause. They 
function  as  if  customers  are  policing  price  levels;  thus,  they  can  also  be  framed  as 
constituting information exchange.114 
Even when buyers voluntary agree to some practices, it does not mean that they 
collectively will benefit from them; they would be better off if none accepted.115 As stated in 
Gavil and others, although MFC clauses ‘may appear favorable to individual buyers, their 
widespread use may be harmful to buyers as a group … Each firm that makes such a promise 
raises its own cost of cutting price. It effectively ties its own hands so that it won’t have an 
incentive to cheat making a price war less likely’.116 Posner comments with wit that sellers 
might even pay buyers to agree to such clauses.117 
In GE/Westinghouse,118 both companies promised electric equipment customers that if 
any  got  a lower price,  the firm  would retroactively  give that lower price to  the original 
customer, by refunding the difference. In DuPont,119 when DuPont and Ethyl (and sometimes 
PPG) offered MFC clauses, the FTC unsuccessfully tried to bring the case as a unilateral 
practice using Section 5, among other challenges.120 
Baker generally criticises the overreliance in certain efficiencies of MFC clauses such 
as lowering search costs for uniformed weak buyers and assurance to long-term contracts.121 
In the FPs scenario, he reports MFC clauses in drugs reimbursement contracts of pharmacies 
with  RxCare,  a  dominant  network. 122  It  imposed  that  if  pharmacies  accepted  lower 
reimbursements from others, they would have to ac cept lower rates from RxCare, which 
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discouraged selective discounting.123 As to the raising rivals cost theory, firms that want to 
reach coordination press for MFC clauses by their suppliers to assure that ‘new entrants and 
existing competition will not be able to obtain lower costs by getting better prices from those 
suppliers’.124 The idea is that MFC clauses as vertical restraints increase the marginal costs of 
certain entrant firms inducing them to reduce output or raise prices; finally, the remaining 
downstream firms, who pressed for the clauses, can also do the same without fear that rivals 
would undermine the ‘co-operation’.125 
In the GVR, MFC clauses are described as ‘supportive measures’ to enforce RPMs 
towards buyers.126 Nevertheless, since it is unlikely  that these clauses are a product of a 
horizontal agreement, 127 they should be attacked, when anticompetitive, as an unlawful 
vertical agreement both under Section 1 and article 101(1). The restriction of competition is 
not between the parties of the agreemen t but the effects are FPs and softening competition 
among sellers. Legally, this should not matter, since a restrictive effect is found.128 
2.  Loyalty Discounts 
Quantity requirements and price incentives often amount to exclusivity contracts and share 
the same effects.129 Loyalty discounting, the practice whereby discounts are granted based on 
the purchase of most or all of its requirements from the seller, is an example of that. In 
comparison  to MFC and price matching clauses, there is a commitment to the buyer t o 
acquire a high share of purchases and there is a new kind of commitment to the sellers: to 
maintain a price difference between agreeing and non-agreeing buyers.130 
Elhauge’s approach proves that loyalty discounts produce anticompetitive effects by 
perversely discouraging discounting and matching rivals. Firms can raise prices above the 
competitive levels for both loyal and free buyers, even in different assumptions.131 There is 
less incentive to compete for free buyers, since any price reduction to win sales  will also 
lower prices to loyal buyers, making it more costly to compete. 132 Elhauge interestingly 
claims that loyalty discounts can have these kinds of anticompetitive effects even if: 1) 
buyers can breach or terminate commitments; 2) the requirements are s ubstantially less than 
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100%; and 3) discounts are small (eg 1 to 3%).133 The most welcome finding is that when 
multiple firms offer loyalty discounts, anticompetitive effects are exacerbated since there is 
even less incentive for each firm to undercut prices  to capture the few uncommitted buyers 
available and the resulting equilibrium is less vulnerable to defection.134 
This economically proves that loyalty rebates may constitute vertical FPs. Though this 
collusive effect is not directly mentioned in the GVR,  the cumulative foreclosure analysis, 
adopted by the US Supreme Court cases and the GVR, has thus been shown to have a sound 
economic basis.135 This discount-discouragement effect is independent of any exclusionary 
ones and the rule of reason and an effects-based approach continue to be appropriate due to 
possible efficiencies.136 Like in MFC contexts, parallel loyalty rebate schemes do not tend to 
be adopted by formal horizontal agreements/concerted practices. Therefore, the vertical 
agreements’ path seems more feasible, especially in cases where not all oligopolists adopt 
loyalty rebates, whenever there is a restriction of competition. A careful analysis under the 
rule of reason or article 101(3) should be carried out. 
3.  RPM 
Despite common arguments that RPM is economically equivalent to non-price restraints, it 
has a special ability to  facilitate tacit coordination.137 Manufacturers that want to collude 
often rely on indirect imperfect evidence, such as retail prices, to infer potential deviations, 
especially  when  t hey  do  not  directly  observe  each  other’s  behaviours. 138 RPM  allows 
manufacturers  to  control  prices  and  detect  deviations  with  certainty,  although  sometimes 
manufacturers prefer control with some flexibility, because retailers base their decisions on 
wholesale tariffs and changing local stocks on demand and cost.139 As an FP, RPM enhances 
the  transparency  of  retail  prices  facilitating  tacit  coordination  in  case  of  imperfect 
observability of rivals.140 The upstream commitment to compete less aggressively with each 
other leads to higher retail prices when rivals are expected to become less aggressive as well: 
this effect is more prominent when RPM is adopted by multiple competing manufacturers. 141 
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As  noted  by  Gavil  and  others,  the  Court  in  Leegin142 failed  to  address  this  dampening 
competition situation.143 
Competition between manufacturers for scarce shelf space provides incentives for 
manufacturer-induced RPMs, but this may lead to anticompetitive effects such as entry 
deterrence in retailing, and protection of downstream rents.144 When only one firm of a retail 
duopoly adopts RPM, this interestingly leads to higher prices in the retail level. 145 According 
to Shaffer’s model, the retailer choosing RPM acts as price leader while the uncommitted 
firm acts as a price follower, with both retailers earning higher profits than in benchmark.146 
Industry-wide RPM facilitates tacit coordination when a product is not normally sold 
with services or, although it may be, it does not ‘need’ to be sold with services, because infra-
marginal consumers are experienced enough to dispense with services.147 This test is also 
useful to differentiate RPM really imposed by seller or only nominally imposed by them, 148 
as an FP through dealer pressure. Minimum RPM can be used to prevent countervailing 
buyer power from exerting a constraining influence on monopoly pricing.149 Maximum RPM 
can also lead to higher retail prices, contrary to conventional wisdom that it is always used to 
correct the double-mark up problem.150 
Moreover, selling through common agency or retaile r might give rise to the joint 
maximizing prices being charged at equilibrium when a franchise fee is paid by the retailer to 
the manufacturer.151 First, when the retailer sets prices, it will behave as manufacturers sold 
directly to the final market and could maximise joint profits.152 In addition, even when RPM 
is allowed, the equilibrium to result is the collusive one because each manufacturer will take 
into account the final profit of the retailer when setting the price. 153 In sum, evidence of a 
network of RPM agreements involving a significant share of the upstream supplier market 
makes plausible the theories of FPs in upstream collusion and dampening competition via 
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reciprocal relations.154 On the other hand, evidence of bargaining or market power of retailers 
and their role in instigating RPM lead to the plausibility of the theories of FPs in downstream 
collusion and downstream entry deterrence.155 
In the EU context, paragraph 224 of the GVR mentions that RPM can facilitate tacit 
coordination among suppliers or  buyers, while paragraph 227 mentions the risk of tacit 
coordination between suppliers derived from maximum and RRP when they serve as focal 
points.  However,  a   finding  of  a  vertical  RPM  agreement  invariably  bring  the  harsh 
consequences of an object approach. Since both Argos156 and Football Kits157 were decided 
by object, no horizontal theory of harm was delineated: in Argos, it could only be FPs helping 
downstream collusion by retailers; in Football Kits, downstream entry deterrence of retailers 
and FPs helping upstream collusion of licensors were also a possibility.158 HSAs involving 
exchange of information on prices may be equivalent to HSAs establishing the adoption of 
RPMs, because in the latter, you also communicate an actual commitment to a price; thus, 
they may amount to a concerted practice.  In any case, an (illegal) vertical agreement should 
only be found when a supplier and a distributor share the monopolistic return arising from the 
RPM.159 This would lead to only harmful RPMs being caught. 
In the US, the parallel adoption of RPMs in several supplier-dealer relations with the 
result of refusing to deal with discounting retailers may recall case law related to the concepts 
of FP and amount to an unlawful conspiracy. 160 Gavil and others. note that to avoid the 
qualification  as  ‘agreement’,  two  common  practices  developed:  manufacturer’s  RRP  and 
consignment sales, in which there is no passage of title or risk to the consignee, who acts as 
an agent.161 In any case, the parallel adoption of RRPs and maximum prices may also trigger 
the idea of horizontal agreement/concerted practice since the commitment by means of focal 
points may amount to communication. 
4.  Advertisement Restraints 
Co-operative  advertisement  programmes  (CAPs)  are  schemes  between  a 
manufacturer/distributor towards a retailer in which the former co-operates with the costs of 
advertisement of the latter. Minimum Advertised Prices (MAPs) are practices by which a 
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distributor  sets  the  minimum  price  to  be  shown  in  any  jointly  financed  retailer 
advertisement.162 Some schemes may contain provisions that all advertisement regardless of 
sharing the costs must follow the rules, and more rigid programmes may include intra -store 
advertisement. If rules are breached, the retailer is subject to sanctioning by the manufacturer, 
such as the withdrawal of the amount, which may have drastic consequences.163 It constitutes 
a vertical FP since it helps to maintain retailer or wholesale prices high. Even if the retailer 
may sell the product at any price, she can no longer advertise her di scounted prices; thus, 
consumer information is restrained, price competition is impaired and as a result, there is less 
pressure from the retailers for the manufacturers to cut wholesale prices. 164 The effects of 
MAP may be comparable to RPM, 165 and, especially when adopted in parallel by upstream 
firms, it helps to maintain tacit coordination between them. MAP programs are particularly 
problematic  where  dealers  lose  their  freedom  to  determine  actual  resale  prices  and  to 
advertise their prices out of the progra m. Good evidence of that is when adoption was in 
response to complaints due to excessive competition by retailers, who may help to police the 
scheme, denouncing discounters.166 
These practices have been extensively analysed by US courts, which deemed them 
reasonable by circumventing the inflexibility of  Dr. Miles167 with forced arguments such as 
lack of evidence of ‘agreement’.168 However, after Legin,169 they can be judged more ‘on the 
merits’.170 In the FTC challenge of MAPs under Section 5,171 the five largest USA m usic 
distributors imposed simultaneously and openly a similar rigid MAP policy toward retailers 
that led to an increase in CD prices. The main reason was that intense retail competition 
increased concentration in the industry, which might represent countervailing power to music 
distributors in the future. With less pressure, wholesale prices could be raised. Not only were 
the vertical agreements challenged, but also the horizontal aspect of facilitating an increase in 
the retail price; in the end, a settlem ent was reached without any admission of wrongdoing. 
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The  FP  lessened  competition  between  retailers,  even  though  the  suppliers  imposed  the 
practice; thus, a cautious inference of a horizontal case is recommended.172 
With reference to the following class suits under the Sherman Act, Section 1 could be 
applicable in two settings.173 First, it should cover the parallel adoption of very similar MAP 
programmes, covering 80% of US market. To prove that, Elahi uses the traditional analysis of 
plus factors, such as the uniform wholesale price increase and the contemporaneousness and 
previous announcement of the adoption of the practices before the implementation day. 174 In 
any case, that may resist  Twombly’s requirements of plausibility and fulfil the standard of 
meeting of the minds. Second, in a vertical analysis, an RPM agreement might be implied 
from the circumstances of the distributor-retailer interaction.175 In the EU context, the vertical 
relationship in the same industry, which included MAP policy, was also under investigation. 
The latter ended when the parties changed their practices.176 
5.  Non-Price Restraints: Single Branding and Limited Distribution 
Exclusive territories (or exclusive distribution – ‘I will sell only to you within a territory’177) 
and single branding (also called exclusive dealing – ‘you will buy it only or mostly from me’) 
are sources  of strategic  restraints  that might  keep prices  high, in  the presence of market 
power. 178  Manufacturers  might  desire  to  make  their  distributors  or  retailers  ‘softer’ 
competitors,  relaxing  inter-brand  competition  so  as  to  achieve  higher  profits  and  final 
prices.179 Exclusive territorial clauses are visible and not easily renegotiated, expressing 
credible commitment.180 As shown in the FTC case  Hale and Waterous,181 two water pump 
manufacturers imposed restraints of exclusivity covering 90% of the market for more than 50 
years towards the producers of fire trucks. As a result, there were few reciprocal constraints 
and departure from market division was easily detectable.182 Nevertheless, Tom and others 
claim that concerns with collusive effects may occur even in short-term contracts because 
they remove much of the seller’s incentive to give discounts.183 
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Allain  and others show that exclusive dealing  contracts  makes  collusion easier to 
sustain when interbrand competition is soft enough.184 Loss of variety is also a concern. 185 
Moreover, parallel use of exclusive dealing by suppliers makes monitoring of prices and 
discounts  easier;  this  helps  to  maintain  prices  above  competitive  levels,  at  least  in 
differentiated products.186 
In the GVR, paragraph 130 is concerned with collusive effects derived from single 
branding and paragraph 134 suggests the withdrawal of VBE if individuals have less than 
30% of market share, but there is cumulative effect. Concerning  exclusive distribution, 
paragraph 151 mentions collusive effects in both supply and retail. Paragraphs 154 and 160 
mention that a small number of suppliers may lead to tacit coordination, especially at the 
wholesale level and in the context of multiple exc lusive dealerships, which is interestingly 
exemplified in paragraph 166. According to paragraph 157, buyer power increases the risk of 
tacit coordination in the buyer’s side. Paragraph 168 mentions the risks of tacit coordination 
on both levels derived from exclusive customer allocation while collusive effects of selective 
distribution are covered by paragraph 175, with paragraph 178 emphasising tacit coordination 
of suppliers, and paragraph 181 underlining buying power as generating tacit coordination by 
dealers. Finally, paragraph 182 calls attention to the prohibition of non-compete obligation 
expressed  in  article  5(1)(c)  of  the  VBEs  if  horizontal  tacit  coordination  excludes  less 
important suppliers. 
The  decision  on  whether  the  parallel  adoption  of  single  branding/exclusive 
distribution is an agreement or a concerted practice under Section 1 or article 101 depends on 
how widely communication is interpreted. If the option is to analyse the vertical agreement, 
in the EU, the analysis of the incentives of those who take the initiative of the restraint 
(supplier/dealer) should define whether BEs may be withdrawn. The technique of withdrawal 
to deal with tacit coordination seems to be derived less from the aggregate effect of the sum 
of market shares than from the fact that each and every one of the important suppliers/dealers 
has chosen to act in a parallel fashion in their own self-interest. 
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6.  Category Management, Slotting Allowances, Private Label and Dual Distribution 
Category management (CM) occurs when a retail chain decides ‘to manage its business on a 
category basis and appoints the leading manufacturer in the field as a Category Captain’.187 
There are some questions about CM that involve FPs of a vertical nature. Firstly, there may 
be information exchange with collusive consequences, since distributors pass on information 
from other suppliers to the category captain, particularly relating to future promotions and 
advertisement plans.188 This would follow the approach analysed supra, including the kind of 
information passed on and the anticompetitive intent behind the practice. 
Secondly, as pointed out by Wright, despite being less restrictive, CM is an alternative 
to exclusive dealing since ‘it reduces the retailer’s ability to deviate from the specified or 
implied desired level of promotional performance by placing those decisions in the hands of 
the  category  manager,  or  lowering  the  costs  of  detection  as  a  result  of  the  manager’s 
increased  involvement  in  shelf  space  allocation’.189 According  to  the  new  section  on  the 
GVR,190 CM agreements are block exempted if the supplier/retailer has less than 30% market 
share, though in case of parallel appointment by retailers of the same category captain, a 
withdrawal is necessary. 
Wright notes that manufacturer payments for promotion and exclusionary contractual 
mechanisms often come together. 191 One phenomenon also relating to tactics in the retail 
sector consists of slotting allowances, fees paid by manufacturers to obtain retailer support by 
means of a two-part tariff in which the producer charges a high wholesale price but gives 
back profits in the form of an allowance to get shelf space in retail. 192 At the same time, 
retailers commit to high marginal costs and announce their intention to be less aggressive in 
pricing.193 
If inter-retailer competition is minimal, wholesale price discounts are more commonly 
adopted.194 If competition is intense, RPM will be adopted when contracts are not observable 
and slotting allowances will be used when they are observable. 195 Thus, like RPMs, slotting 
allowances may constitute FPs to tacit coordination.196 While in the US they were challenged 
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in litigation,197 in the EU, there is a whole new section in the GVR dedicated to upfront 
payment to access.198 
Commonly used today for different purposes, private  label and dual distribution are 
not on their own vertical restraints but they may come together with them, which changes 
their  analysis. 199 This  combination  may  result  not  only  in  exclusion  but  also  in  tacit 
coordination. Lianos cites them as examples of hy brid vertical/horizontal practices 200 and 
presents the following definitions: 
  Dual  distribution  occurs  ‘when  the  manufacturer  simultaneously  sells  to 
independent  dealers  and  is  also  present  at  the  distribution  level  of  the 
commercialization process by supplying customers directly’.201 
  Private Label refers to products sold under a retailer’s brand, either on the 
retailer’s own name or in an especially created brand.202 In the GVR, there are 
two references to private label.203 
Concerning dual distribution, the manufa cturer may have the incentive to impose 
price or non-price restraints on the retailers of his network competing with him, lowering 
their margins, which may harm consumers if the manufacturer has brand loyalty or if a high 
percentage of sales are made by ma nufacturer-owned outlets.204 Among the anticompetitive 
effects of a private label, especially when it becomes dominant, are that it may increase the 
search costs of consumers, affect consumer choice and variety if all but the leading national 
brand is excluded, and increase retail prices. 205 Lianos206 and Gilo207 have noted  that the 
Commission subjects dual distribution to a more lenient regime, 208 ignoring the horizontal 
dimension of the source of the restraint. Vertical restraints, except for exclusive distribution , 
may bring more anticompetitive effects than where the supplier does not have its own 
distribution stores.209 
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On the other hand, vertical restraints in the presence of a private label are excluded 
from the VBEs, but they should not always be treated as horizontal, especially when they do 
not limit the use of private labels.210 The above-mentioned incongruence persists in the new 
VBEs. It may be a case of withdrawing the VBEs, in the case of vertical restraints in non -
reciprocated dual distribution while using article 101(3) for efficiency-enhancing restraints in 
private label settings. 
 
E.  LEGAL TOOLS AND ENFORCEMENT 
The  consequences  of  unlawfulness  of  vertical  restraints  facilitating  tacit  coordination  are 
varied and relate to the remedies to be adopted. On the enforcement side, Posner strongly 
advocates  for  financial  penalties,  injunctions,  and  damage  claims  in  the  context  of  tacit 
coordination since the mere threat ‘would cause firms in oligopolistic markets to think twice 
before turning away business on the basis of how competitors might react to the price cut 
necessary to get that (profitable) business’.211 
In a vertical context, it seems that where there is an illegal agreement, the perpetrator, 
that is the coercing/inducing party, should be always held liable. As to the other party, Turner 
claims that ‘stiffening the back of those whom the principal culprit seeks to coerce’ may help 
to prevent violations.212 Nonetheless, the two situations should differ according to whether 
the  party  is  coerced  or  induced.  The  GVR   include  among  the  relevant  factors  in  the 
assessment when enforcing article 101(1) on vertical agreements the analysis of whether the 
restriction was ‘imposed’ or ‘agreed’.213 In my judgment, contrary to Turner’s view,214 only 
the coerced parties should not be held liable or responsible. On the other hand, if parties are 
induced, that is by means of sharing the monopolistic profits or receiving side payments, they 
deserve punishment, should be held liable, and should pay fines proportionate to the probable 
gains. In mixed situations, eg MFC clauses where the dealer itself can demand the clauses, 
the party benefiting from softer competition should be held responsible only if it was active 
in the suggestion. 
In addition, settlements and adjustments are instruments that generally comprise the 
abstention to adopt FPs: in our context, vertical restraints with collusive effects. They also 
may include early payment of discounted fines. The OFT entered into settlements in the 
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tobacco215 and dairy cases.216 In the first, large supermarket and dairy processors colluded to 
increase retail prices by means of sharing commercially sensitive information. In the second, 
there was indirect exchange of proposed future retail prices between competitors and linking 
of the retail price o f a manufacturer’s brand to the retail price of the competing brand of 
another manufacturer. 
Moreover,  market  investigations,  such  as  those  of  the  former  UK  Competition 
Commission  (CC)  under  the  Enterprise  Act  2002,  were  especially  useful  to  deal  with 
structural problems facilitated by conducts. As Whish argues, despite its ‘time-consuming, 
expensive  and  intrusive’  nature,  market  investigations  act  as  a  ‘safety  net’  when  the 
Competition Act 1998 cannot work.217 They can be effective in pointing out problems a nd 
remedies;218 for example, in the CC report on groceries, there was concern about the presence 
of conditions of tacit coordination and the degree of interaction among suppliers, due to the 
large amount of information passed among them, some regarding the f uture plans in the 
context of CM.219 
It is recognised that there are alternative ways of dealing with the complex oligopoly 
problem.220 Merger control seems to be an effective ex ante  option.221 However, concerning 
the enforcement of article 102 to fight tacit coordination, Mezzanote and Monti comment that 
the high risk of error makes it inappropriate. 222 Stroux argues that in terms of evidence 
requirements it does not add anything to art. 101.223 
In the US context, it is worth mentioning briefly Section 5 of the FTC   Act. As 
reported by Gavil and others, in the 1980s it was used by FTC to fill the gap in the Sherman 
Act to reach conducts that violate the ‘spirit; of antitrust statutes or further public values224 
but, as shown, the failure of DuPont has chilled the effort.225 Peritz argues that the proof of 
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agreement is not the only way to trigger a Section 5 violation; it is equally established with 
evidence of anticompetitive intent or lack of an independent business reason in the individual 
conduct. 226  Thus,  he  supports  a  rehab ilitation  of  Section  5  since,  according  to  FTC 
congressional mandate, its scope is broader than Section 1 and 2 and it should focus on 
practices at their incipiency.227 
Gavil and others seem to argue that intent or lack of independent reason would work 
as  a positive factor in  the conscious  parallelism,  as  circumstantial  evidence of concerted 
action.228 This may lead to a different view, expressed by Page that, after  Twombly, there is 
no substantive gap between Section 5 and Section 1 but a procedural gap.229 This can  be 
passed by means of application to the FTC by private parties, who lack detailed information 
that makes conspiracy plausible. They may present evidence to FTC, and after its collection 
of information, they could proceed under Section 1.230 I would side with Peritz since Section 
5 is substantially different from Section 1 and the requirement of agreement is not at all 
present therein. In economically robust cases, Section 5 would be especially effective when a 
vertical restraint, such as MFC or exclusive dealing, is adopted by only some of the firms.231 
 
F.  CONCLUSION 
Networks  of  vertical  restraints  blur  the  differences  between  vertical  and  horizontal 
agreements; therefore, both options of attack are available for enforcers in the EU and the US 
context. If the analysed vertical restraints are adopted in parallel by agreement, they should 
be deemed illegal as long as they restrict competition, producing collusive consequences. In 
the  absence  of  explicit  coordination  to  adopt  the  practice,  I  suggest  first  looking  for  a 
stretched  concept  of  horizontal  agreement  or  a  broadly  interpreted  concept  of  concerted 
practice, including unilateral ‘communication’ that intentionally reduces uncertainty. Even 
when the analysed practices are adopted individually and not by all firms, they can represent 
a  commitment  to  focal  points,  observable  by  market  players,  thus  amounting  to 
communication of intent. If that is not possible, I then propose that an analysis of market 
power,  incentives,  coercion  and  induction  should  guide  the  finding  of  an  illegal  vertical 
agreement and ground the analysis of the consequences. The agreement/concerted practice 
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path is an appropriate, feasible and coherent way to deal with vertical restraints facilitating 
horizontal  tacit  coordination,  but  also  does  not  exclude  alternative  effective  enforcement 
mechanisms. 